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surety, but there can be 'no alternative for holding persons re-
sponsible for the clearly stated undertakings in the document
which they signed voluntarily.
Building Contracts
In Hero & Co. v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co.3 the material-
man who furnished supplies to a subcontractor made a written
accepted agreement with the prime contractor whereby in con-
sideration of the contractor's making checks and payments joint-
ly payable to subcontractor and supplier, the latter waived its
"material lien privilege." Notwithstanding this agreement, the
supplier recorded its affidavits for unpaid materials and brought
suit for recognition of its lien. The court held the supplier to its
waiver agreement and denied the lien, thereby indicating that
the law which provides the lien is not a rule of public order and
can be waived by proper agreement. The partial dissent raises
what appears to be a serious point that since the prime con-
tractor had withheld the last payment due to the subcontractor
there had never been any payment for a part of the supplies fur-
nished; accordingly, for these supplies the consideration of joint-
ly payable checks had not been -performed and to that extent the
waiver should not apply. This point seems to have some validity
but it is not clear from the evidence of complicated transactions
and imputations of partial payments (as between subcontractor
and supplier) that the supplier had not received enough money
to pay for all the materials furnished and that there was the
necessary identification of certain unpaid supplies with the final




.One of the principal problem areas in the subject of liberative
prescription is the classification of the cause of action, on ac-
count of the differences in the length of time necessary in the
respective cases. Among the specific problems, a troublesome
3. 236 La. 306, 107 So.2d 650 (1958).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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one is the three-year prescription for "accounts."' The court has
stated the well-established principle that "the prescriptive period
is fixed by the nature of the debt and not by the fact that an
account is rendered showing that the debt is due" and also the
interpretation that "in the Code it is intended that the word
[accounts] shall include sales on account, and not the mere fact
that an account must be rendered."' 2 Nevertheless, this three-
year prescription continues to be urged where it is shorter than
the usual alternative of ten years for personal actions. It is un-
usual, however, for both plaintiff and defendant to plead this
three-year prescription on "accounts" in the same case, and both
pleas to be overruled by the court. This is exactly what hap-
pened in the case of Jones v. Jones,8 where the plaintiff sued the
defendant for an account of an undivided interest in a mineral
lease, and the defendant filed a reconventional demand to recover
an itemized account of funds which he had advanced or paid to
the plaintiff. In both instances, the court held that these were
not the kind of accounts included in Civil Code Article 3538 and,
therefore, that the proper prescription was the ten-year pre-
scription relating to personal actions.
4
A similar problem involving classification of the cause of
action occurred in Loews, Inc. v. Don George, Inc.5 The court
held that the claim based on violation of the Louisiana Monopoly
Act 6 for unlawful conspiracy and anti-trust practices did not
arise out of contract or quasi contract between theatre owner
and film distributor, but was in the nature of a tort action for
which the prescription was one year.7
The illegal seizure and detention of an automobile in connec-
tion with the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage constitutes a
quasi offense and the claim for damages is subject to the pre-
scription of one year." In the case of Hernandez v. Harson9 it
was held that the time started to run in this case only from the
date of the judgment which declared the seizure illegal. This is
sound for two reasons. In the first place, the basic theory of lib-
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3538 (1870).
2. Antoine v. Franichevich, 163 So. 784, 786 (La. App. 1935), aff'd, 184 La.
612, 167 So. 98 (1936).
3. 236 La. 52, 106 So.2d 713 (1958).
4.':LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3544 (1870).
5. 237 La. 132, 110 So.2d 553 (1959).
6. LA. R.S. 51:121 et seq. (1950).
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3536 (1870).
8. Ibid.
.9. '237 La. 389, 111 So.2d 320 (1959).
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erative prescription is that time runs against a person only when
he has a right of action and does not exercise it, and in the case
of a wrongful seizure the rights of the parties are not finally
determined until the rendition of judgment on this point. Sec-
ondly, the claim for damages includes the illegal detention (as
well as the seizure) and the amount of damages cannot be fixed
until the period of wrongful detention is ascertained.
MINERAL RIGHTS*
Harriet S. Daggett**
The companion cases of Reagan v. Murphy' and Jones v. Sun
Oil Company2 presented for determination the question whether
or not the liberative prescription of ten years could be properly
applied to a mineral lease. This question was answered in the
negative in the Reagan case, and that decision governed the
Jones case. In the Reagan case, the plaintiff's vendor, in 1941,
granted a mineral lease covering some 19,000 acres on several
non-contiguous tracts for a primary term of ten years. In 1942,
vendor sold to plaintiff a 40 acre tract, subject to the lease, and
reserved the mineral rights. There was production on some of
the tracts within the primary term and therefore the lease was
in full effect beyond its primary term, at least as to those pro-
ducing tracts. However, there had been no drilling operations
on plaintiff's 40 acre tract, which was non-contiguous to the pro-
ducing property, and the mineral servitude thereon prescribed.
In 1954 plaintiff sued for cancellation of the lease insofar as it
affected his tract on grounds of prescription. In reversing the
lower court's decision that the mineral lease was prescribed as
to the plaintiff's tract by ten years non-usage, the Supreme
Court held that ten-year liberative prescription of mineral servi-
tudes or real rights does not apply to a mineral lease. The court
said a mineral lease -creates only personal rights, and R.S.
9:1105,3 even in its amended form, did not have the effect of
changing these rights from personal to real rights. Since Arent
*Grateful acknowledgment is hereby registered to my student and friend Robert
F. LeBlanc for his work in the preparation of these materials.
**Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958).
2. 235 La. 554, 105 So.2d 219 (1953).
3. LA. R.S. 9:1105 (1950) : "Oil, gas, and other mineral leases, and contracts
applying to and affecting these leases or the right to reduce oil, gas, or'other
